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Teams Do Inflict Costly Third-Party Punishment as Individuals Do: Experimental Evidence (2021)
Journal Article
Kamei, K. (2021). Teams Do Inflict Costly Third-Party Punishment as Individuals Do: Experimental Evidence. Games, 12(1), Article 22. https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010022

Initiated by the seminal work of Fehr and Fischbacher (Evolution and Human Behavior (2004)), a large body of research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when they are not directly involved in transactions. T... Read More about Teams Do Inflict Costly Third-Party Punishment as Individuals Do: Experimental Evidence.

Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships (2020)
Journal Article
Kamei, K. (2021). Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 37(2), 392-439. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewaa020

Clientelism is frequently observed in our societies. Various mechanisms that help sustain incomplete political contracts (e.g., monitoring and punishment) have been studied in the literature to date. However, do such contracts emerge in elections wit... Read More about Incomplete Political Contracts with Secret Ballots: Reciprocity as a Force to Enforce Sustainable Clientelistic Relationships.

Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions (2020)
Journal Article
Kamei, K. (2020). Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 171, 234-246. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.022

This paper experimentally studies individuals’ voluntary disclosure of past behaviors and its effects in a finitely repeated two-player public goods game. The experiment data found that voluntary information disclosure strengthens cooperation under c... Read More about Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions.

Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma: Experimental Evidence (2019)
Journal Article
Kamei, K. (2019). Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma: Experimental Evidence. International Journal of Game Theory, 48(3), 797-834. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00663-7

Exogenously imposed infinite repetition is known to mitigate people’s uncooperative behaviors in dilemma situations with partner matching through personal enforcement. One as yet unanswered question is whether people collectively choose to interact w... Read More about Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma: Experimental Evidence.

Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma (2018)
Journal Article
Kamei, K. (2019). Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma. Oxford Economic Papers, 71, 600-622. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpy045

Teams are known to behave differently from individuals, but whether they behave more cooperatively or selfishly is still unsettled in the literature. We let subjects form two-person pairs and play a finitely-repeated two-player public goods game with... Read More about Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma.

The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms (2018)
Journal Article
Kamei, K. (2018). The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms. Economics Letters, 171, 193-197. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.043

This paper presents results from a prisoner’s dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in... Read More about The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms.

Group Size Effect and Over-Punishment in the Case of Third Party Enforcement of Social Norms (2018)
Journal Article
Kamei, K. (2020). Group Size Effect and Over-Punishment in the Case of Third Party Enforcement of Social Norms. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 175, 395-412. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.002

One of the important topics in public choice is how people's free-riding behavior could differ by group size in collective action dilemmas. This paper experimentally studies how the strength of third party punishment in a prisoner's dilemma could dif... Read More about Group Size Effect and Over-Punishment in the Case of Third Party Enforcement of Social Norms.

Disapproval aversion or inflated inequity acceptance? The impact of expressing emotions in ultimatum bargaining (2017)
Journal Article
Chen, J., & Kamei, K. (2018). Disapproval aversion or inflated inequity acceptance? The impact of expressing emotions in ultimatum bargaining. Experimental Economics, 21(4), 836-857. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9554-z

Past experimental research has shown that when rating systems are available, buyers are more generous in accepting unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. However, it also suggests that, under these conditions, sellers behave more fairly to avoid rece... Read More about Disapproval aversion or inflated inequity acceptance? The impact of expressing emotions in ultimatum bargaining.

Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus (2017)
Journal Article
Kamei, K., & Putterman, L. (2018). Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus. Economic Inquiry, 56(1), 158-172. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12477

Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism, but it is often unclear what motivates an agent to report another's behavior when it is easy for the aggrieved individual to move on. In a sharply focused laboratory experiment, we find that many c... Read More about Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus.

Endogenous Reputation Formation under the Shadow of the Future (2017)
Journal Article
Kamei, K. (2017). Endogenous Reputation Formation under the Shadow of the Future. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 142, 189-204. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.012

Recent research has shown that making people’s decisions known to others may enhance cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games with random matching. This paper experimentally studies whether people can cooperate with each other by e... Read More about Endogenous Reputation Formation under the Shadow of the Future.

Punishment Can Support Cooperation Even When Punishable (2017)
Journal Article
Fu, T., Ji, Y., Kamei, K., & Putterman, L. (2017). Punishment Can Support Cooperation Even When Punishable. Economics Letters, 154, 84-87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.016

Do opportunities to punish non-punishers help to stabilize cooperation? Or do opportunities to punish punishers harm cooperation and its benefits by deterring first order punishment and wasting resources? We compare treatments of a decision experimen... Read More about Punishment Can Support Cooperation Even When Punishable.

Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games (2016)
Journal Article
Kamei, K., & Putterman, L. (2016). Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games. The Economic Journal, 127(602), 1069-1095. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12320

Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to “wipe clean” one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation... Read More about Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games.

Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality (2016)
Journal Article
Kamei, K. (2018). Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62(3), 626-655. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716656446

Unequally distributed resources are ubiquitous. The decision of whether to promote competition or equality is often debated in societies and organizations. With heterogeneous endowments, we let subjects collectively choose between a public good that... Read More about Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality.

Democracy and Resilient Pro-Social Behavioral Change: An Experimental Study (2016)
Journal Article
Kamei, K. (2016). Democracy and Resilient Pro-Social Behavioral Change: An Experimental Study. Social Choice and Welfare, 47(2), 359-378. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0967-y

Both experimental and empirical studies have shown that democratically imposing a policy that encourages cooperation may increase its effectiveness by enhancing the voters’ cooperation behavior. But, do those involved in the democratic decision-makin... Read More about Democracy and Resilient Pro-Social Behavioral Change: An Experimental Study.

In Broad Daylight: Fuller Information and Higher-Order Punishment Opportunities Can Promote Cooperation (2015)
Journal Article
Kamei, K., & Putterman, L. (2015). In Broad Daylight: Fuller Information and Higher-Order Punishment Opportunities Can Promote Cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 120, 145-159. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.020

The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are competing claims about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or undermine coope... Read More about In Broad Daylight: Fuller Information and Higher-Order Punishment Opportunities Can Promote Cooperation.

State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods (2014)
Journal Article
Kamei, K., Putterman, L., & Tyran, J. (2015). State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Experimental Economics, 18(1), 38-65. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0

We investigate the endogenous formation of sanctioning institutions supposed to improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. Our paper parallels Markussen et al. (Rev Econ Stud 81:301–324, 2014) in that our experimental subjects vot... Read More about State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods.

Conditional Punishment (2014)
Journal Article
Kamei, K. (2014). Conditional Punishment. Economics Letters, 124(2), 199-202. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.017

We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishment decisions to an individual are on average significantly positively proportional to other members’ punishment decisions to that individual.