Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus

Kamei, K.; Putterman, L.

Abstract

Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism, but it is often unclear what motivates an agent to report another's behavior when it is easy for the aggrieved individual to move on. In a sharply focused laboratory experiment, we find that many cooperators pay to report a defecting partner without the possibility of pecuniary benefit when this has the potential to deprive the latter of future gains and to help his next partner. We illustrate how a social preference can explain such costly reporting, and also discuss evidence for a role of emotions. (JEL C91, D03, D63)

Citation

Kamei, K., & Putterman, L. (2018). Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus. Economic Inquiry, 56(1), 158-172. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12477

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 9, 2017
• Online Publication Date: Aug 10, 2017
• Publication Date: Jan 1, 2018
• Deposit Date: May 10, 2017
• Publicly Available Date: Aug 10, 2018
• Journal: Economic Inquiry
• Print ISSN: 0095-2583
• Electronic ISSN: 1465-7295
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 56
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 158-172
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12477
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1387720