K. Kamei
Democracy and Resilient Pro-Social Behavioral Change: An Experimental Study
Kamei, K.
Authors
Abstract
Both experimental and empirical studies have shown that democratically imposing a policy that encourages cooperation may increase its effectiveness by enhancing the voters’ cooperation behavior. But, do those involved in the democratic decision-making process change their behavior when faced with an exogenously implemented rule? This paper experimentally shows that the voters that are involved in a successful democratic selection of a policy behave more pro-socially as consistent with recent studies. My experiment moreover shows that such a successful democratic imposition of the policy may increase the voters’ level of cooperation even when the policy is undemocratically imposed.
Citation
Kamei, K. (2016). Democracy and Resilient Pro-Social Behavioral Change: An Experimental Study. Social Choice and Welfare, 47(2), 359-378. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0967-y
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | May 3, 2016 |
Online Publication Date | May 26, 2016 |
Publication Date | Aug 1, 2016 |
Deposit Date | May 11, 2016 |
Publicly Available Date | May 13, 2016 |
Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
Print ISSN | 0176-1714 |
Electronic ISSN | 1432-217X |
Publisher | Springer |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 47 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 359-378 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0967-y |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1412684 |
Related Public URLs | http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1756225 |
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© The Author(s) 2016 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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