K. Kamei
Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma
Kamei, K.
Authors
Abstract
Teams are known to behave differently from individuals, but whether they behave more cooperatively or selfishly is still unsettled in the literature. We let subjects form two-person pairs and play a finitely-repeated two-player public goods game with other pairs, and then compare the pairs’ behaviour with the behaviour of individuals in the same game played against individuals. We vary treatments by the matching protocol between decision-making units (partner or stranger matching). Our data show that when the matching is fixed for all periods, pairs are able to sustain cooperation at high levels while individuals steadily decrease contributions from period to period. By sharp contrast, when pairs are randomly matched with other pairs in every period, they quickly decrease contributions over the periods, as is the case for individuals with the stranger matching protocol.
Citation
Kamei, K. (2019). Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma. Oxford Economic Papers, 71, 600-622. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpy045
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Jul 26, 2018 |
Online Publication Date | Sep 1, 2018 |
Publication Date | Jul 30, 2019 |
Deposit Date | Jul 26, 2018 |
Publicly Available Date | Sep 1, 2020 |
Journal | Oxford Economic Papers |
Print ISSN | 0030-7653 |
Electronic ISSN | 1464-3812 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 71 |
Pages | 600-622 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpy045 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1325323 |
Files
Accepted Journal Article
(1.5 Mb)
PDF
Copyright Statement
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Oxford Economic Papers following peer review. The version of record Kamei, K. (2018). Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma. Oxford Economic Papers 71(3): 600-622. is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpy045
You might also like
Disapproval Aversion or Inflated Inequity Acceptance? The Impact of Expressing Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining
(2017)
Preprint / Working Paper
Cooperation and Endogenous Repetition in an Infinitely Repeated Social Dilemma
(2017)
Preprint / Working Paper
Group Size Effect and Over-Punishment in the Case of Third Party Enforcement of Social Norms
(2018)
Preprint / Working Paper
Downloadable Citations
About Durham Research Online (DRO)
Administrator e-mail: dro.admin@durham.ac.uk
This application uses the following open-source libraries:
SheetJS Community Edition
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
PDF.js
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
Font Awesome
SIL OFL 1.1 (http://scripts.sil.org/OFL)
MIT License (http://opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.html)
CC BY 3.0 ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
Powered by Worktribe © 2024
Advanced Search