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Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma

Kamei, K.

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Authors

K. Kamei



Abstract

Teams are known to behave differently from individuals, but whether they behave more cooperatively or selfishly is still unsettled in the literature. We let subjects form two-person pairs and play a finitely-repeated two-player public goods game with other pairs, and then compare the pairs’ behaviour with the behaviour of individuals in the same game played against individuals. We vary treatments by the matching protocol between decision-making units (partner or stranger matching). Our data show that when the matching is fixed for all periods, pairs are able to sustain cooperation at high levels while individuals steadily decrease contributions from period to period. By sharp contrast, when pairs are randomly matched with other pairs in every period, they quickly decrease contributions over the periods, as is the case for individuals with the stranger matching protocol.

Citation

Kamei, K. (2019). Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma. Oxford Economic Papers, 71, 600-622. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpy045

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jul 26, 2018
Online Publication Date Sep 1, 2018
Publication Date Jul 30, 2019
Deposit Date Jul 26, 2018
Publicly Available Date Sep 1, 2020
Journal Oxford Economic Papers
Print ISSN 0030-7653
Electronic ISSN 1464-3812
Publisher Oxford University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 71
Pages 600-622
DOI https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpy045
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1325323

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Copyright Statement
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Oxford Economic Papers following peer review. The version of record Kamei, K. (2018). Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma. Oxford Economic Papers 71(3): 600-622. is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpy045





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