Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions

Kamei, K.

Abstract

This paper experimentally studies individuals’ voluntary disclosure of past behaviors and its effects in a finitely repeated two-player public goods game. The experiment data found that voluntary information disclosure strengthens cooperation under certain conditions, although a non-negligible fraction of individuals do not disclose information about the past and proceed to behave opportunistically. On closer inspection, the data revealed that the material incentives of disclosure acts differ according to the matching protocol. Specifically, disclosers receive higher payoffs than non-disclosers if the disclosers are assured to be matched with like-minded disclosers; conversely, disclosers are vulnerable to exploitation by others under random matching. These results suggest that mandatory disclosure helps enhance economic efficiency if individuals’ hiding and uncooperative behaviors are liable to precipitate a collapse in the community norms.

Citation

Kamei, K. (2020). Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 171, 234-246. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.022

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jan 21, 2020
• Online Publication Date: Feb 12, 2020
• Publication Date: Mar 31, 2020
• Deposit Date: Jan 26, 2020
• Publicly Available Date: Aug 12, 2021
• Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
• Print ISSN: 0167-2681
• Electronic ISSN: 2328-7616
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 171
• Pages: 234-246
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.022
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1278797