Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games

Kamei, K.; Putterman, L.

Abstract

Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to “wipe clean” one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation's value in a cycle of bad behaviour, whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their “reforming” themselves. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate what subjects learn from playing a finitely repeated dilemma game with endogenous, symmetric partner choice. We find that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in cooperative reputation grows following exogenous restarts, although earlier end-game behaviours are observed.

Citation

Kamei, K., & Putterman, L. (2016). Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning from Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games. The Economic Journal, 127(602), 1069-1095. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12320

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 29, 2015
• Online Publication Date: Jul 25, 2016
• Publication Date: Jul 25, 2016
• Deposit Date: Jul 7, 2015
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 25, 2018
• Journal: The Economic Journal
• Print ISSN: 0013-0133
• Electronic ISSN: 1468-0297
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 127
• Issue: 602
• Pages: 1069-1095
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12320
• Keywords: Cooperation, Reputation, Voluntary contribution, Public goods, Sorting, Endogenous grouping, Group formation, Experiment.
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1402769