Disclosure or not, when there are three bidders?

Li, Daniel Z.

Abstract

This paper provides a more general sufficient condition than Hummel and McAfee (2015) for optimal information disclosure in auctions when there are three bidders. We show that the optimal disclosure policy is related to the skewness of the distribution of bidders' valuations. Specifically, if the distribution is skewed to the left (right), it is optimal for the seller to reveal full (no) information to the bidders. And if it is symmetric, then there's no difference between revealing information or not.

Citation

Li, D. Z. (2016). Disclosure or not, when there are three bidders?. Economics Bulletin, 36(1), 349-354

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Mar 17, 2016
• Online Publication Date: Mar 17, 2016
• Publication Date: Mar 17, 2016
• Deposit Date: Apr 28, 2016
• Publicly Available Date: May 4, 2016
• Journal: Economics Bulletin
• Print ISSN: 1545-2921
• Publisher: Economics Bulletin
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 36
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 349-354
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1383416
• Publisher URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/