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Participation and Welfare in Auctions with Default

Lee, J.; Li, D.Z.

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Authors

J. Lee



Abstract

In an auction with costly participation, we show that bidder default may cause social welfare loss through (i) the possibility of no trade and (ii) the under participation of bidders in equilibrium. We also provide closed-form solutions to the model.

Citation

Lee, J., & Li, D. (2019). Participation and Welfare in Auctions with Default. Economics Letters, 183, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108620

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Aug 12, 2019
Online Publication Date Aug 14, 2019
Publication Date Oct 31, 2019
Deposit Date Aug 19, 2019
Publicly Available Date Feb 14, 2021
Journal Economics Letters
Print ISSN 0165-1765
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 183
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108620
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1290103

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Copyright Statement
© 2019 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/





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