J. Lee
Sequential Search with Adaptive Intensity
Lee, J.; Li, D.
Abstract
This paper studies sequential search problems, where a searcher chooses search intensity adaptively in each period. We fully characterize the optimal search rule and value, decomposing the inter-temporal change of search intensity into the fall-back value effect and the deadline effect. We show that the optimal search intensity (value) is submodular (supermodular) in fall-back value and time. It follows that the fall-back value effect increases when the deadline approaches, and the deadline effect decreases when a searcher’s fall-back value gets higher. We further identify the connection between search with full and no recall to quantify the value of recall
Citation
Lee, J., & Li, D. (2022). Sequential Search with Adaptive Intensity. International Economic Review, 63(2), 803-829. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12551
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Sep 10, 2021 |
Online Publication Date | Oct 25, 2021 |
Publication Date | 2022-05 |
Deposit Date | Sep 13, 2021 |
Publicly Available Date | Oct 26, 2023 |
Journal | International Economic Review |
Print ISSN | 0020-6598 |
Electronic ISSN | 1468-2354 |
Publisher | Wiley |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 63 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 803-829 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12551 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1240802 |
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Copyright Statement
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Lee, J. & Li, D. (2022). Sequential Search with Adaptive Intensity. International Economic Review 63(2): 803-829, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12551. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
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