Ranking Equilibrium Competition in Auctions with Participation Costs

Li, D.Z.

Abstract

This paper studies the degrees of equilibrium competition in three common forms of auctions with costly participation, and shows that, when bidders’ valuation distribution is concave, there is a simple condition to rank the equilibrium competition of those auctions. It also investigates how the results are related to stochastic ordering of bidders’ valuation distributions, and provides some illustrative examples.

Citation

Li, D. (2017). Ranking Equilibrium Competition in Auctions with Participation Costs. Economics Letters, 153, 47-50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.003

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Feb 3, 2017
• Online Publication Date: Feb 4, 2017
• Publication Date: Feb 4, 2017
• Deposit Date: Feb 6, 2017
• Publicly Available Date: Aug 4, 2018
• Journal: Economics Letters
• Print ISSN: 0165-1765
• Electronic ISSN: 1873-7374
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 153
• Pages: 47-50
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.003
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1365859