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Dr Christopher Cowie's Outputs (30)

A New Case for Moral Skepticism: The Argument from Paradox 1 (2025)
Journal Article
Cowie, C. (in press). A New Case for Moral Skepticism: The Argument from Paradox 1. Journal of Philosophy,

It is nearly half a century since moral philosophers first began to grapple with a series of troubling axiological paradoxes. It now looks as though they may resist satisfactory resolution. Concern is growing that this supports skepticism. I provide... Read More about A New Case for Moral Skepticism: The Argument from Paradox 1.

Optimism in the Search for Extraterrestrial Life? A Philosophical Perspective (2025)
Journal Article
Cowie, C. (online). Optimism in the Search for Extraterrestrial Life? A Philosophical Perspective. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,

The large number of planets in our galaxy is often appealed to as the basis for optimism that life exists beyond earth in sufficiently large quantities that we might reasonably hope to detect or otherwise encounter it. In an article published over th... Read More about Optimism in the Search for Extraterrestrial Life? A Philosophical Perspective.

Methodological Conservatism in the Assessment of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (2025)
Journal Article
Cowie, C. (in press). Methodological Conservatism in the Assessment of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena. Ergo,

The vast majority of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) can be given everyday explanations. Sightings turn out to be, for example, aeroplanes, clouds, or shooting stars. But some resist explanation. Speculation is rife with respect to their natur... Read More about Methodological Conservatism in the Assessment of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena.

Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory (2023)
Journal Article
Cowie, C. (2023). Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory. Journal of Philosophy, 120(9), 457-483. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2023120927

Moral error theory has many troubling and counterintuitive consequences. It entails, for example, that actions we ordinarily think of as obviously wrong are not wrong at all. This simple observation is at the heart of much opposition to error theory.... Read More about Why Moral Paradoxes Support Error Theory.

Confidence of Life Detection: The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (2023)
Journal Article
Vickers, P., Cowie, C., Dick, S. J., Gillen, C., Jeancolas, C., Rothschild, L. J., & McMahon, S. (online). Confidence of Life Detection: The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Astrobiology, 23(11), https://doi.org/10.1089/ast.2022.0084

Potential biosignatures offering the promise of extraterrestrial life (past or present) are to be expected in the coming years and decades, whether from within our own solar system, from an exoplanet atmosphere, or otherwise. With each such potential... Read More about Confidence of Life Detection: The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.

What are Paradoxes? (2022)
Journal Article
Cowie, C. (2023). What are Paradoxes?. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 9(1), 154-171. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2021.48

According to a standard view, paradoxes are arguments with plausible premises that entail an implausible conclusion. This is false. In many paradoxes the premises are not plausible precisely because they entail an implausible conclusion. Obvious resp... Read More about What are Paradoxes?.

Arguing About Extraterrestrial Intelligence (2022)
Journal Article
Cowie, C. (2023). Arguing About Extraterrestrial Intelligence. Philosophical Quarterly, 73(1), 64-83. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqac009

Avi Loeb has defended the hypothesis that the interstellar object, ‘Oumuamua, detected in 2017, is in fact an extraterrestrial artefact. His hypothesis has been widely rejected by the scientific community. On examination however it is not clear why.... Read More about Arguing About Extraterrestrial Intelligence.

Introduction (2019)
Book Chapter
Cowie, C., & Rowland, R. (2020). Introduction. In Companions in guilt : arguments in metaethics (1-16). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429454677-1

This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book aims to distinguish between two kinds of companions in guilt strategy: by analogy, and by entailment. It explores the methodology o... Read More about Introduction.

Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox? (2019)
Journal Article
Cowie, C. (2020). Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?. Philosophical Studies, 177(6), 1685-1702. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01280-6

In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution to Moore’s Paradox. It is that Moore’s Paradox is explained by the existence of a constitutive norm on belief. I focus on a constitutive norm relates that relates belief to kn... Read More about Do Constitutive Norms on Belief Explain Moore's Paradox?.

The Similarity Hypothesis in Metaethics (2018)
Book Chapter
Cowie, C. (2018). The Similarity Hypothesis in Metaethics. In J. Suikkanen, & A. Kauppinen (Eds.), Methodology and moral philosophy (127-147). Routledge

Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity (2018)
Book Chapter
Cowie, C., & Greenberg, A. (2018). Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity. In C. Kyriacou, & R. McKenna (Eds.), Metaepistemology : realism and anti-realism (173-196). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_8

According to constitutivists about epistemic normativity, epistemic normativity is explained by the nature of belief. Specifically, it is explained by the fact that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, belief stands in a normative relation to truth.... Read More about Constitutivism about Epistemic Normativity.