Companions in Guilt Arguments

Cowie, Christopher

Abstract

Arguments for some controversial positions in metaethics—typically moral scepticism or the moral error theory—are sometimes thought to overreach. They appear to entail sceptical or error‐theoretic views about non‐moral branches of thought in a sense that is costly or implausible. If this is true, those metaethical arguments should be rejected. This is the companions in guilt strategy in metaethics. In this article, the contemporary use of the companions in guilt strategy is explored and assessed. The methodology of the strategy is discussed, and criteria for assessing specific instances of its use are identified. Prominent instances of its use in the contemporary literature are then examined. The focus is on those that take (a) epistemic judgment, (b) prudential judgment, and (c) mathematical judgment as “companions,” with a view to undermining the moral error theory and moral scepticism, respectively.

Citation

Cowie, C. (2018). Companions in Guilt Arguments. Philosophy Compass, 13(11), Article e12528. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12528

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Feb 15, 2018
• Online Publication Date: Jun 26, 2018
• Publication Date: Nov 30, 2018
• Deposit Date: Feb 18, 2018
• Publicly Available Date: Jun 26, 2020
• Journal: Philosophy Compass
• Electronic ISSN: 1747-9991
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 13
• Issue: 11
• Article Number: e12528
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12528
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1338841