A New Case for Moral Skepticism: The Argument from Paradox 1

Cowie, Christopher

Abstract

It is nearly half a century since moral philosophers first began to grapple with a series of troubling axiological paradoxes. It now looks as though they may resist satisfactory resolution. Concern is growing that this supports skepticism. I provide the first full articulation and defence of this concern in the form of a case for global axiological skepticism and a tentative roadmap for extension to a broader moral skepticism. The result is an alternative to the disagreement and debunking based-arguments that predominate in contemporary metaethics.

Citation

Cowie, C. (in press). A New Case for Moral Skepticism: The Argument from Paradox 1. Journal of Philosophy,

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: May 30, 2025
• Deposit Date: Jun 2, 2025
• Journal: Journal of Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 0022-362X
• Electronic ISSN: 1939-8549
• Publisher: Journal of Philosophy
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/4042728
• Publisher URL: https://www.pdcnet.org/jphil