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All Outputs (39)

Adolescents, Cognitive Ability, and Minimax Play (2015)
Journal Article
Geng, S., Peng, Y., Shachat, J., & Zhong, H. (2015). Adolescents, Cognitive Ability, and Minimax Play. Economics Letters, 128, 54-58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.007

We conduct experiments with adolescent participants on repeated fixed play in three different zero-sum games which have mixed strategy minimax solutions. Further, we collect subject information on cognitive abilities and participation rates in compet... Read More about Adolescents, Cognitive Ability, and Minimax Play.

A Hidden Markov Model for the Detection of Pure and Mixed Strategy Play in Games (2014)
Journal Article
Shachat, J., Swarthout, J., & Wei, L. (2015). A Hidden Markov Model for the Detection of Pure and Mixed Strategy Play in Games. Econometric Theory, 31(04), 729-752. https://doi.org/10.1017/s026646661400053x

We propose a statistical model to assess whether individuals strategically use mixed strategies in repeated games. We formulate a hidden Markov model in which the latent state space contains both pure and mixed strategies. We apply the model to data... Read More about A Hidden Markov Model for the Detection of Pure and Mixed Strategy Play in Games.

An Experimental Investigation of Auctions and Bargaining in Procurement (2014)
Journal Article
Shachat, J., & Tan, L. (2015). An Experimental Investigation of Auctions and Bargaining in Procurement. Management Science, 61(5), 1036-1051. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1880

In reverse auctions, buyers often retain the right to bargain further concessions from the winners. The optimal form of such procurement is an English auction followed by an auctioneer's option to engage in ultimatum bargaining with the winners. We s... Read More about An Experimental Investigation of Auctions and Bargaining in Procurement.

Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection (2013)
Journal Article
Shachat, J., & Swarthout, J. (2013). Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection. Games, 4(4), 738-753. https://doi.org/10.3390/g4040738

We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price seq... Read More about Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection.

Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence. (2012)
Journal Article
Shachat, J., & Swarthout, J. (2012). Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 36(3), 383-402. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2011.09.007

We report results from an experiment in which humans repeatedly play one of two games against a computer program that follows either a reinforcement or an experience weighted attraction learning algorithm. Our experiment shows these learning algorith... Read More about Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence..

Procuring Commodities: First-Price Sealed-Bid or English Auctions? (2012)
Journal Article
Shachat, J., & Wei, L. (2012). Procuring Commodities: First-Price Sealed-Bid or English Auctions?. Marketing Science, 31(2), 317-333. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1120.0704

We use laboratory experiments to examine the relative performance of the English auction (EA) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPA) when procuring a commodity. The mean and variance of prices are lower in the FPA than in the EA. Bids and price... Read More about Procuring Commodities: First-Price Sealed-Bid or English Auctions?.

Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods. (2010)
Journal Article
Shachat, J., & Swarthout, J. (2010). Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods. Decision Analysis, 7(1), 6-22. https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.1090.0159

We consider two mechanisms to procure differentiated goods: a sealed-bid buyer-determined auction and a dynamic-bid price-based auction with bidding credits. The sealed-bid buyer-determined auction is analogous to the “request for quote” procedure co... Read More about Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods..

Information aggregation in a catastrophe futures market. (2006)
Journal Article
Shachat, J., & Westerling, A. (2006). Information aggregation in a catastrophe futures market. Managerial and Decision Economics, 27(6), 477-495. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.1283

We experimentally examine a reinsurance market in which participants have differing information regarding the probability distribution over losses. The key question is whether the market equilibrium reflects traders maximizing value with respect to t... Read More about Information aggregation in a catastrophe futures market..

Measuring trust and trustworthiness. (2005)
Book Chapter
Leland, J., Houser, D., & Shachat, J. (2005). Measuring trust and trustworthiness. In H. Höhmann, & F. Welter (Eds.), Trust and Entrepreneurship: A West-East Perspective (87-96). Edward Elgar Publishing

Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents? (2004)
Journal Article
Shachat, J., & Swarthout, J. (2004). Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 59(3), 359-373. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860400354

We conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting de... Read More about Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?.

Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games. (2004)
Journal Article
Shachat, J., & Walker, M. (2004). Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games. Journal of Economic Theory, 114(2), 280-309. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531%2803%2900125-x

We describe an experiment based on a simple two-person game designed so that different learning models make different predictions. Econometric analysis of the experimental data reveals clear heterogeneity in the subjects’ learning behavior. But the s... Read More about Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games..

Hide and seek in Arizona. (2003)
Journal Article
Rosenthal, R., Shachat, J., & Walker, M. (2003). Hide and seek in Arizona. International Journal of Game Theory, 32(2), 273-293. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300159

Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of “hide and seek”. Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player’s ro... Read More about Hide and seek in Arizona..

Trust, the Internet, and the digital divide (2003)
Journal Article
Huang, H., Keser, C., Leland, J., & Shachat, J. (2003). Trust, the Internet, and the digital divide. IBM systems journal, 42(3), 507-518. https://doi.org/10.1147/sj.423.0507

The Internet is expected to have a positive impact on economic growth, and its adoption rate will determine the extent of this impact. In this paper, we examine how differences in willingness to trust influence Internet adoption rates across countrie... Read More about Trust, the Internet, and the digital divide.

Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis (2002)
Journal Article
Shachat, J. (2002). Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis. Journal of Economic Theory, 104(1), 189-226. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2915

This paper reports on a set of experiments designed to discriminate among the possible sources of the failure of the unique mixed strategy minimax equilibrium of the O'Neill (1987) game. This is accomplished by introducing a new methodology for elici... Read More about Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis.

On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games. (2001)
Journal Article
Wooders, J., & Shachat, J. (2001). On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 34(2), 342-363. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0808

We study equilibrium and maximin play in supergames consisting of the sequential play of a finite collection of stage games, where each stage game has two outcomes for each player. We show that for two-player supergames in which each stage game is st... Read More about On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games..

An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play. (2001)
Journal Article
Cox, J., Shachat, J., & Walker, M. (2001). An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play. Games and Economic Behavior, 34(1), 11-33. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0786

We report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of Jordan's model of Bayesian learning in games of incomplete information. A finite example is constructed in which the model generates unique predictions of subjects' choices... Read More about An Experiment to Evaluate Bayesian Learning of Nash Equilibrium Play..

An Experimental Investigation of the Incentives to Form Agricultural Marketing Pools. (1998)
Journal Article
Hoffman, E., Libecap, G., & Shachat, J. (1998). An Experimental Investigation of the Incentives to Form Agricultural Marketing Pools. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42(2-3), 287-304. https://doi.org/10.1006/jmps.1998.1216

This paper presents theoretical extensions and laboratory tests of Hoffman and Libecap's (1994) model of individual firms' incentives to form agricultural marketing pools. The key incentives are lower variance in output prices and economies in scale... Read More about An Experimental Investigation of the Incentives to Form Agricultural Marketing Pools..