Hide and seek in Arizona.

Rosenthal, R.W.; Shachat, J.; Walker, M.

Abstract

Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of “hide and seek”. Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player’s role in the game; an asymmetry across the game variations; and positive serial correlation in subjects’ play. Possible explanations for these departures are considered.

Citation

Rosenthal, R., Shachat, J., & Walker, M. (2003). Hide and seek in Arizona. International Journal of Game Theory, 32(2), 273-293. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300159

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: 2003-12
• Deposit Date: Sep 17, 2014
• Journal: International Journal of Game Theory
• Print ISSN: 0020-7276
• Electronic ISSN: 1432-1270
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 32
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 273-293
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300159
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1453967