Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?

Shachat, J.; Swarthout, J.T.

Abstract

We conducted an experiment in which each subject repeatedly played a game with a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies against some computer-implemented mixed strategy. The results indicate subjects are successful at detecting and exploiting deviations from Nash equilibrium. However, there is heterogeneity in subject behavior and performance. We present a one variable model of dynamic random belief formation which rationalizes observed heterogeneity and other features of the data.

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: 2004-07
• Deposit Date: Sep 17, 2014
• Journal: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
• Print ISSN: 1432-2994
• Electronic ISSN: 1432-5217
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 59
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 359-373
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860400354
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1420825