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Information aggregation in a catastrophe futures market.

Shachat, J.; Westerling, A.


A. Westerling


We experimentally examine a reinsurance market in which participants have differing information regarding the probability distribution over losses. The key question is whether the market equilibrium reflects traders maximizing value with respect to their different priors, or whether the equilibrium is one based on a common belief incorporating all participants' information. When assuming subjects are expected value maximizers, we reject both full information aggregation and no information aggregation equilibria. We discover, as in past individual choice insurance experiments, that buyers under-assess the probabilities of large loss states, or alternatively, subjects assign larger utility values to losses than to comparable gains. After accounting for these decision theoretic concerns, the non-aggregation of information hypothesis explains the data better than full information aggregation.


Shachat, J., & Westerling, A. (2006). Information aggregation in a catastrophe futures market. Managerial and Decision Economics, 27(6), 477-495.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2006-09
Deposit Date Sep 17, 2014
Journal Managerial and Decision Economics
Print ISSN 0143-6570
Electronic ISSN 1099-1468
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 27
Issue 6
Pages 477-495
Public URL