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Essentially Aggregative Harm, Restraint, and Collectivization

Kahn, Elizabeth

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Abstract

Some of the most pressing contemporary social problems result from the amalgamation of a mass of actions that are not intentionally coordinated. Although these essentially aggregative harms are foreseeable, it is unclear what moral duties individuals have with regards to them. This paper offers a new analysis of these problems and uses a nonideal contractualist approach to argue in favour of two kinds of duties for individuals. Collectivization duties that require individuals to act responsively with a view to ensuring that there are effective governance agents that reliably, fairly, and efficiently prevent these outcomes in the long-term and duties of restraint that require individuals to avoid action of a kind that is likely to come together with other actions to cause serious EAH in the immediate future when restraint with regards to actions of this kind could help prevent the outcome from occurring.

Citation

Kahn, E. (2023). Essentially Aggregative Harm, Restraint, and Collectivization. Political Theory, https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917231185187

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jun 9, 2023
Online Publication Date Jul 25, 2023
Publication Date 2023
Deposit Date Jul 31, 2023
Publicly Available Date Jul 31, 2023
Journal Political Theory
Print ISSN 0090-5917
Electronic ISSN 1552-7476
Publisher SAGE Publications
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917231185187
Keywords Sociology and Political Science; History
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1708658

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Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Copyright Statement
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access page (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).




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