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Bilateral Delegation in Wage and Employment Bargaining in Monopoly

Chatterjee, I.; Saha, B.

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Authors

I. Chatterjee



Abstract

We study efficiency and distributional implications of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly. Delegation causes underproduction, and the bargaining pie severely contracts rendering mutual gains from delegation impossible. With an increase in the union’s bargaining power profit may perversely rise and the union’s utility may fall.

Citation

Chatterjee, I., & Saha, B. (2013). Bilateral Delegation in Wage and Employment Bargaining in Monopoly. Economics Letters, 120(2), 280-283. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.009

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Apr 5, 2013
Online Publication Date Apr 15, 2013
Publication Date Aug 1, 2013
Deposit Date Aug 7, 2014
Publicly Available Date Jun 17, 2016
Journal Economics Letters
Print ISSN 0165-1765
Electronic ISSN 1873-7374
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 120
Issue 2
Pages 280-283
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.009
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1447033

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Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Copyright Statement
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Open access under CC BY license.This article is available under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). You may distribute and copy the article, create extracts, abstracts, and other revised versions, adaptations or derivative works of or from an article (such as a translation), to include in a collective work (such as an anthology), to text or data mine the article, including for commercial purposes without permission from Elsevier. The original work must always be appropriately credited.






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