Dr Bibhas Saha b.c.saha@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor
Extractive bribe and default in subsidized credit programs.
Saha, B.; Thampy, T.
Authors
T. Thampy
Abstract
We present a dynamic model of subsidized credit provision to examine how asymmetric information exacerbates inefficiency caused by corruption. If a borrower and a corrupt official interact with symmetric information, credit terms can be so designed that corruption will affect only the borrower’s profit, but not repayment. With private information on the borrower’s productivity this result changes. Because of dynamic information rents, the official may induce one type of the borrower to default. The government can improve the repayment rate, but will have to under-provide credit. In contrast, some allowance of default permits a greater supply of credit.
Citation
Saha, B., & Thampy, T. (2006). Extractive bribe and default in subsidized credit programs. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60(2), 182-204. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.05.004
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Publication Date | 2006-06 |
Deposit Date | Aug 7, 2014 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
Print ISSN | 0167-2681 |
Publisher | Elsevier |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 60 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 182-204 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.05.004 |
Keywords | Corruption, Information rent, Countervailing incentive, Ratchet effect. |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1425214 |
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