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The Vacuous Concept of Shareholder Voting Rights

Attenborough, D.

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The shareholder empowerment debate in corporate law is premised upon a reoccurring assumption that, historically, there has been an erosion of shareholder rights. This article contends that this premise is inaccurate and that shareholder rights have remained fundamentally constant. It goes on to argue that a more promising approach to the existing understanding of rights in the shareholder empowerment debate may be found in the broader legal rights literature. In analysing shareholder rights through this lens it is contended that, while there has not been an appreciable abrogation of shareholder rights, it is in the nature of legal rights per se to contain power whilst simultaneously reinforcing the institutions and structures from where those rights emanate.


Attenborough, D. (2013). The Vacuous Concept of Shareholder Voting Rights. European Business Organization Law Review, 14(2), 147-173.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Jun 1, 2013
Deposit Date Feb 20, 2015
Publicly Available Date Jun 15, 2015
Journal European Business Organization Law Review
Print ISSN 1566-7529
Electronic ISSN 1741-6205
Publisher T.M.C Asser Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 14
Issue 2
Pages 147-173
Keywords Company law, Corporate governance, Shareholders, Rights theory.


Published Journal Article (237 Kb)

Copyright Statement
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors 2013 This paper has been published by Cambridge University Press in 'European business organization law review' (14:2 (2013) 147-173)

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