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The Consequence of Takeover Methods: Schemes of Arrangement vs. Takeover Offers

Alqobali, Hala; Li, Daniel

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Authors

Hala Alqobali

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Daniel Li daniel.li@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor



Abstract

This paper examined the effect of two selling processes in the UK market: takeover offers and schemes of arrangement. The latter is argued to allow a bidder to acquire a target company more cheaply and easily because schemes provide a lower threshold of the target company’s shares before “squeeze-out” procedures may be used. To address potential self-selection bias arising from bidders’ ability to choose their acquisition method, the propensity score matching methodology was applied to 803 takeovers of listed-target firms from 1995–2018. The results showed that the scheme of arrangement significantly reduces the target shareholders’ gain relative to the takeover offer.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Aug 8, 2022
Online Publication Date Aug 16, 2022
Publication Date 2022
Deposit Date Dec 5, 2022
Publicly Available Date Dec 6, 2022
Journal International Journal of Financial Studies
Publisher MDPI
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 10
Issue 3
DOI https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs10030069
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1185104

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