Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence (2023)
Journal Article
Galanis, S., Ioannou, C. A., & Kotronis, S. (in press). Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence. The Review of Economic Studies,

Eye-image as Nonverbal Social Cue has Asymmetric Gender Effects in Dictator Taking Games (2023)
Journal Article
Chowdhury, S. M., Young Jeon, J., & Saha, B. (2023). Eye-image as Nonverbal Social Cue has Asymmetric Gender Effects in Dictator Taking Games. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102087

Dictator giving games often demonstrate that nonverbal social cues, such as drawn-in eyes on display, induce pro-social behavior in the form of giving more. Notably, sometimes this effect is seen to differ between males and females. However, the effe... Read More about Eye-image as Nonverbal Social Cue has Asymmetric Gender Effects in Dictator Taking Games.

Performance Cycles (2023)
Journal Article
Lagziel, D., & Lehrer, E. (2023). Performance Cycles. Economic Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01516-x

A decision maker repeatedly exerts efforts to produce new outputs, while being compensated based on his past and current production levels. We show that the decision maker’s optimal strategy dictates a cyclic oscillatory performance whenever the comp... Read More about Performance Cycles.

The Value of Information in Stopping Problems (2023)
Journal Article
Lehrer, E., & Wang, T. (in press). The Value of Information in Stopping Problems. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,

We consider stopping problems in which a decision maker (DM) faces an unknown state of nature and decides sequentially whether to stop and take an irreversible action; pay a fee and obtain additional information; or wait without acquiring informati... Read More about The Value of Information in Stopping Problems.

Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining and Innovation (2023)
Journal Article
Mukherjee, A., & Saha, B. (in press). Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining and Innovation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,

A firm undertakes workers’ productivity improving R&D before negotiating wage with the union, where negotiation can take place between their incentivised delegates. Under bilateral delegation profit, R&D and productivity-wage gap all increase, whilst... Read More about Bilateral Delegation, Wage Bargaining and Innovation.

Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games (2023)
Journal Article
Anbarci, N., Cingiz, K., & Ismail, M. S. (2023). Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games. Mathematical Social Sciences, 125, 94-100. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.07.002

In this note, we introduce a general model of dynamic n-player multi-battle Blotto contests in which asymmetric resources and non-homogeneous battlefield prizes are possible. Each player’s probability of winning the prize in a battlefield is govern... Read More about Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games.

Weighted Utility and Optimism/Pessimism: A Decision-Theoretic Foundation of Various Stochastic Dominance Orders (2023)
Journal Article
Lehrer, E., & Wang, T. (in press). Weighted Utility and Optimism/Pessimism: A Decision-Theoretic Foundation of Various Stochastic Dominance Orders. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,

We show that a probability distribution likelihood-ratio dominates another distribution if and only if, for every weighted utility function, the former is preferred over the latter. Likewise, a probability distribution hazard-rate (or reverse hazard... Read More about Weighted Utility and Optimism/Pessimism: A Decision-Theoretic Foundation of Various Stochastic Dominance Orders.

When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (2023)
Journal Article
Dogan, B., & Yenmez, M. B. (in press). When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?. Economic Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01488-y

We study multistage centralized assignment systems to allocate scarce resources based on priorities in the context of school choice. We characterize schools’ capacity-priority profiles under which an additional stage of assignment may improve student... Read More about When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?.

Monologues, dialogues, and common priors (2022)
Journal Article
Di Tillio, A., Lehrer, E., & Samet, D. (2022). Monologues, dialogues, and common priors. Theoretical Economics, 17(2), 587-615. https://doi.org/10.3982/te4508

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a simple criterion enabling to conclude that two agents do not share a common prior. The criterion is simple, as it does not require information about the agents' knowledge and beliefs, but rather only the... Read More about Monologues, dialogues, and common priors.

Screening Dominance: A Comparison of Noisy Signals (2022)
Journal Article
Lagziel, D., & Lehrer, E. (2022). Screening Dominance: A Comparison of Noisy Signals. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14(4), 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200284

This paper studies the impact of noisy signals on screening processes. It deals with a decision problem in which a decision-maker screens a set of elements based on noisy unbiased evaluations. Given that the decision-maker uses threshold strategies,... Read More about Screening Dominance: A Comparison of Noisy Signals.

Matching with Externalities (2022)
Journal Article
Pycia, M., & Yenmez, M. B. (2023). Matching with Externalities. The Review of Economic Studies, 90(2), 948-974. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac032

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We... Read More about Matching with Externalities.

Multidimensional Bargaining and Posted Prices (2021)
Journal Article
Hagen, M., & Hernando-Veciana, A. (2021). Multidimensional Bargaining and Posted Prices. Journal of Economic Theory, 196, Article 105317. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105317

A seller and a buyer bargain over the quantities and prices of multiple goods. Both agents have private information about their preferences. Utility is quasilinear in money. We show that a deterministic mechanism satisfies (i) dominant-strategy incen... Read More about Multidimensional Bargaining and Posted Prices.

Subjective utilitarianism: Individual decisions in a social context (2020)
Journal Article
Alon, S., & Lehrer, E. (2020). Subjective utilitarianism: Individual decisions in a social context. Journal of Economic Theory, 190, Article 105108. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105108

Individual decisions are often subjectively affected by other-regarding considerations. We model a decision maker influenced by a grand group of significant others. Each sub-group of significant others is a possible social context, and the decision m... Read More about Subjective utilitarianism: Individual decisions in a social context.

Prejudice, Bias and Identity Neutral Policy (2020)
Journal Article
Bag, P. K., Saha, B., & Sikdar, S. (2021). Prejudice, Bias and Identity Neutral Policy. Social Choice and Welfare, 56(1), 173-203. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01275-x

How does identity blind hiring, as opposed to sighted hiring, influence matching between high ability candidates and high value jobs? Job seekers might face constraints in signaling their abilities for lack of wealth and being denied education. Addin... Read More about Prejudice, Bias and Identity Neutral Policy.

Trade in the Time of the COVID-19 Outbreak (2020)
Journal Article
Kumar De, U., & Saha, B. (2020). Trade in the Time of the COVID-19 Outbreak

There are several predictions about the drastic fall in international trade as results of the global negative externality of ongoing pandemic Covid-19. Still we are in the middle of the crisis and do not know the exact span and scale of it. It is thu... Read More about Trade in the Time of the COVID-19 Outbreak.

Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: A set-valued games approach (2020)
Journal Article
Lehrer, E., & Teper, R. (2020). Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: A set-valued games approach. Games and Economic Behavior, 122, 440-452. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.008

We study allocation problems when agents negotiate across different agendas. Unlike existing papers on multi-agenda disputes, we consider environments in which resources are constrained and investing (time or effort) in one agenda reduces the ability... Read More about Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: A set-valued games approach.

Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism (2020)
Journal Article
Lagziel, D., & Lehrer, E. (2021). Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism. Economic Theory, 71(2), 483-504. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01264-2

We design incentive schemes for portfolio managers that screen low-skill managers: only the best portfolio managers, in terms of expected payoffs, agree to participate in a single-period investment. The results hold in general financial markets, wher... Read More about Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism.

Constrained no-regret learning (2020)
Journal Article
Du, Y., & Lehrer, E. (2020). Constrained no-regret learning. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 88, 16-24. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.002

Household Self-Employment Eliminates Child Labour (2019)
Book Chapter
Saha, B. (2019). Household Self-Employment Eliminates Child Labour. In S. Bandyopadhya, & M. Dutta (Eds.), Opportunities and challenges in development : essays for Sarmila Banerjee (357-366). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9981-7

This paper shows that if a minimal proportion of poor households is empowered with self-employment opportunities, child labour will not arise in equilibrium. The economy will have a unique `good' equilib- rium generating a suciently high wage to supp... Read More about Household Self-Employment Eliminates Child Labour.

Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in Libor Submissions (2019)
Journal Article
Hernando-Veciana, A., & Tröge, M. (2020). Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in Libor Submissions. The Review of Financial Studies, 33(6), 2585-2621. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz101

Interbanking rates were, until recently, based on judgmental estimates of borrowing costs. We interpret this as a cheap-talk game that allowed banks to communicate nonverifiable information about their opportunity cost to potential counterparties. Un... Read More about Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in Libor Submissions.