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Dr Katherine Puddifoot's Outputs (24)

Dissolving the epistemic/ethical dilemma over implicit bias (2017)
Journal Article
Puddifoot, K. (2017). Dissolving the epistemic/ethical dilemma over implicit bias. Philosophical Explorations, 20(sup1), 73-93. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1287295

It has been argued that humans can face an ethical/epistemic dilemma over the automatic stereotyping involved in implicit bias: ethical demands require that we consistently treat people equally, as equally likely to possess certain traits, but if our... Read More about Dissolving the epistemic/ethical dilemma over implicit bias.

Stereotyping: The Multifactorial View (2017)
Journal Article
Puddifoot, K. (2017). Stereotyping: The Multifactorial View. Philosophical Topics, 45(1), 137-156. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20174518

This paper proposes and defends the multifactorial view of stereotyping. According to this view, multiple factors determine whether or not any act of stereotyping increases the chance of an accurate judgment being made about an individual to whom the... Read More about Stereotyping: The Multifactorial View.

Accessibilism and the Challenge from Implicit Bias (2015)
Journal Article
Puddifoot, K. (2016). Accessibilism and the Challenge from Implicit Bias. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97(3), 421-434. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12056

Recent research in social psychology suggests that many beliefs are formed as a result of implicit biases in favour of members of certain groups and against members of other groups. This article argues that beliefs of this sort present a counterexamp... Read More about Accessibilism and the Challenge from Implicit Bias.

A defence of epistemic responsibility: why laziness and ignorance are bad after all (2014)
Journal Article
Puddifoot, K. (2014). A defence of epistemic responsibility: why laziness and ignorance are bad after all. Synthese, 191(14), 3297-3309. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0445-y

It has been suggested, by Michael Bishop, that empirical evidence on human reasoning poses a threat to the internalist account of epistemic responsibility, which he takes to associate being epistemically responsible with coherence, evidence-fitting a... Read More about A defence of epistemic responsibility: why laziness and ignorance are bad after all.