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Dr Katherine Puddifoot's Outputs (24)

Knowing your past: Trauma, stress, and mnemonic epistemic injustice (2024)
Journal Article
Puddifoot, K., & Sandelind, C. (2024). Knowing your past: Trauma, stress, and mnemonic epistemic injustice. Journal of Social Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12557

There is strong psychological evidence suggesting that social and institutional structures can cause people to experience trauma and stress that leads to memory distortion and disorganisation. We argue that these outcomes can constitute a mnemonic fo... Read More about Knowing your past: Trauma, stress, and mnemonic epistemic injustice.

Poverty, Stereotypes and Politics: Counting the Epistemic Costs (2023)
Book Chapter
Puddifoot, K. (in press). Poverty, Stereotypes and Politics: Counting the Epistemic Costs. In L. Smith, & A. Archer (Eds.), The Moral Psychology of Poverty. Springer Nature

Epistemic analyses of stereotyping describe how they lead to misperceptions and misunderstandings of social actors and events. The analyses have tended so far to focus on how people acquire stereotypes and/or how the stereotypes lead to distorted per... Read More about Poverty, Stereotypes and Politics: Counting the Epistemic Costs.

Implicit Bias and Epistemic Oppression in Confronting Racism (2022)
Journal Article
Holroyd, J., & Puddifoot, K. (2022). Implicit Bias and Epistemic Oppression in Confronting Racism. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 8(3), 476-495. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2021.12

Motivating reforms to address discrimination and exclusion is important. But what epistemic practices characterise better or worse ways of doing this? Recently, the phenomena of implicit biases have played a large role in motivating reforms. We argue... Read More about Implicit Bias and Epistemic Oppression in Confronting Racism.

Stereotypes, Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Dispositions (2021)
Book Chapter
Puddifoot, K. (2021). Stereotypes, Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Dispositions. In K. McCain, S. Stapleford, & M. P. Steup (Eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003134565

People sometimes face an epistemic dilemma with regards to stereotyping. We harbor a stereotype that reflects something of social reality, e.g., high rates of criminal involvement among members of a certain social group. But if we apply the stereotyp... Read More about Stereotypes, Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Dispositions.

Mnemonic Justice (2020)
Book Chapter
Puddifoot, K. (in press). Mnemonic Justice. In S. Goldberg, & S. Wright (Eds.), Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press

Epistemic Injustice and Implicit Bias (2020)
Book Chapter
Holroyd, J., & Puddifoot, K. (2020). Epistemic Injustice and Implicit Bias. In E. Beeghly, & A. Madva (Eds.), An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice and the Social Mind. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315107615

Because our knowledge-generating abilities are connected to our moral worth, we can wrong other people by treating them in ways that are disrespectful of their knowledge-generating abilities or place unjust epistemic burdens on them. Such wrongs are... Read More about Epistemic Injustice and Implicit Bias.

Disclosure of Mental Health: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives (2019)
Journal Article
Puddifoot, K. (2019). Disclosure of Mental Health: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 26(4), 333-348. https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2019.0048

Should people with mental health conditions ‘come out proud’, disclosing information about their condition(s)? Recent research highlights how disclosing this information can promote empowerment and decrease self-stigma. However, many people with ment... Read More about Disclosure of Mental Health: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives.

Implicit Bias and Prejudice (2019)
Book Chapter
Holroyd, J., & Puddifoot, K. (2019). Implicit Bias and Prejudice. In M. G. Fricker, J. H. Peter, & N. David Pedersen (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315717937

Empirical research has substantiated the finding that very many of us harbour implicit biases: fast, automatic, and difficult to control processes that encode stereotypes and evaluative content, and influence how we think and behave. The influence of... Read More about Implicit Bias and Prejudice.

Philosophy, Bias and Stigma (2019)
Book Chapter
Bortolotti, L., & Puddifoot, K. (2019). Philosophy, Bias and Stigma. In P. D. Bubbio, & J. Malpass (Eds.), Why Philosophy?. De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110650990-007

In this chapter we discuss the impact of philosophical research on our understanding of the world. Considering two examples from our areas of research, we argue that empirically informed philosophy can help us both reduce and control the effects of i... Read More about Philosophy, Bias and Stigma.

Re-evaluating the credibility of eyewitness testimony: the misinformation effect and the overcritical juror (2018)
Journal Article
Puddifoot, K. (2020). Re-evaluating the credibility of eyewitness testimony: the misinformation effect and the overcritical juror. Episteme, 17(2), 255-279. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.42

Eyewitnesses are susceptible to recollecting that they experienced an event in a way that is consistent with false information provided to them after the event. The effect is commonly called the misinformation effect. Because jurors tend to find eyew... Read More about Re-evaluating the credibility of eyewitness testimony: the misinformation effect and the overcritical juror.

The Bright Side of Memory Errors (2018)
Other
Puddifoot, K., & Bortolotti, L. (2018). The Bright Side of Memory Errors

The paper discusses the epistemic benefits of cognitive mechanisms producing distorted memories. Aimed at a non-specialist audience.

Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs (2018)
Journal Article
Puddifoot, K., & Bortolotti, L. (2019). Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs. Philosophical Studies, 176(3), 755-780. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1038-2

Findings from the cognitive sciences suggest that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for some memory errors are adaptive, bringing benefits to the organism. In this paper we argue that the same cognitive mechanisms also bring a suite of significant... Read More about Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs.

Epistemic Discrimination (2017)
Book Chapter
Puddifoot, K. (2017). Epistemic Discrimination. In K. Lippert-Rasmussen (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Discrimination (54-67). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315681634

Epistemic discrimination is prejudice, bias and discriminatory action suffered by individuals in their position as epistemic agents, that is, as individuals who can acquire knowledge, justified belief or understanding. Epistemic discrimination can be... Read More about Epistemic Discrimination.