Outputs (2)

Why Don't You Two Get a Room? A Puzzle and Pricing Model of Extra Services in Hotels (2012)
Journal Article
Damianov, D., & Sanders, S. (2012). Why Don't You Two Get a Room? A Puzzle and Pricing Model of Extra Services in Hotels. Journal of Industrial Organization Education, 6(1), Article 1035. https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-5041.1035

This case study focuses on the following “rational riddle” raised in a recent popular economics book: Hotels in Britain usually charge per guest while hotels in the US typically charge per room. What is the reason for this difference? We propose a pr... Read More about Why Don't You Two Get a Room? A Puzzle and Pricing Model of Extra Services in Hotels.

Seller Competition by Mechanism Design (2012)
Journal Article
Damianov, D. (2012). Seller Competition by Mechanism Design. Economic Theory, 51(1), 105-137. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0597-z

This paper analyzes a market game in which sellers offer trading mechanisms to buyers and buyers decide which seller to go to depending on the trading mechanisms offered. In a (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this market, sellers hold auctions with a... Read More about Seller Competition by Mechanism Design.