All Outputs (22)

Better but Wrong: Assessing Conflicts Between the Deontic and the Evaluative (2025)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (online). Better but Wrong: Assessing Conflicts Between the Deontic and the Evaluative. Philosophia, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-025-00816-x

In recent work, Benjamin Ferguson and Sebastian Köhler take interest in the claim that permissible acts are always morally better than impermissible acts (BOP). They argue that BOP is both commonsensical and supported by powerful theoretical consider... Read More about Better but Wrong: Assessing Conflicts Between the Deontic and the Evaluative.

On Leaving Space for Altruism (2021)
Journal Article
Faraci, D., & Jaworski, P. M. (online). On Leaving Space for Altruism. Public Affairs Quarterly, 35(2), https://doi.org/10.2307/48616068

Review of Methodology and Moral Philosophy (2019)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (online). Review of Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews,

Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge (2019)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (2019). Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 16(1), 63-73. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20170002

Given a traditional intuitionist moral epistemology, it is notoriously difficult for moral realists to explain the reliability of our moral beliefs. This has led some to go looking for an alternative to intuitionism. Perception is an obvious contende... Read More about Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge.

Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence (2019)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (2019). Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence. Philosophers' Imprint, 19(4), 1-26

Many philosophers hold out hope that some final condition on knowledge will allow us to overcome the limitations of the classic "justified true belief" analysis. The most popular intuitive glosses on this condition frame it as an absence of epistemic... Read More about Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence.

Wage Exploitation and the Nonworseness Claim: Allowing the Wrong, to Do More Good (2019)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (2019). Wage Exploitation and the Nonworseness Claim: Allowing the Wrong, to Do More Good. Business Ethics Quarterly, 29(2), 169-188. https://doi.org/10.1017/beq.2018.28

Many believe that employment can be wrongfully exploitative, even if it is consensual and mutually beneficial. At the same time, it may seem third parties should not do anything to preclude or eliminate such arrangements, given these same considerati... Read More about Wage Exploitation and the Nonworseness Claim: Allowing the Wrong, to Do More Good.

We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes (2018)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (2020). We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes. Mind, 129(513), 225-234. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy054

Barry Maguire argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. ‘There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to’ this thesis, he claims. In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. I first examine Maguire's purpor... Read More about We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.

Review of Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability (2018)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (2018). Review of Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Analysis, 78(2), 377-381. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/any019

This volume covers two related debates in both meta-ethics and the philosophy of mathematics, with brief forays into the philosophies of logic and religion and the history of ethics. The first debate is about ‘evolutionary debunking arguments’ (EDAs)... Read More about Review of Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability.

Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge (2017)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (2017). Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge. Journal of ethics & social philosophy, 12(3), 312-318. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i3.279

Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, And The Presumption Of Goodness (2017)
Journal Article
Faraci, D., & Shoemaker, D. (2019). Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, And The Presumption Of Goodness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 98(3), 606-622. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12470

Ethical Judgment and Motivation (2017)
Book Chapter
Faraci, D., & McPherson, T. (2017). Ethical Judgment and Motivation. In T. McPherson, & D. Plunkett (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of metaethics (308-323). Routledge

On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege-Geach to Illuminate Expressivism's Problem with Objectivity (2017)
Book Chapter
Faraci, D. (2017). On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege-Geach to Illuminate Expressivism's Problem with Objectivity. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaethics (244-264). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805076.003.0010

In print, the central objection to expressivism has been the Frege–Geach problem. Yet most cognitivists seem to be motivated by “deeper” worries, ones they have spent comparatively little time pursuing in print. Part of the explanation for this misma... Read More about On Leaving Room for Doubt: Using Frege-Geach to Illuminate Expressivism's Problem with Objectivity.

Review of Moral Psychology & Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics (2015)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (2015). Review of Moral Psychology & Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews,

This collection contains essays from the Workshop on Moral Psychology and Human Agency at the University of Michigan in 2012, funded through co-editor Daniel Jacobson's Templeton grant, "The Science of Ethics." The editors describe the contributors a... Read More about Review of Moral Psychology & Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics.

Huck vs. Jojo: Moral Ignorance and the (A)symmetry of Praise and Blame (2015)
Book Chapter
Faraci, D., & Shoemaker, D. (2015). Huck vs. Jojo: Moral Ignorance and the (A)symmetry of Praise and Blame. In J. Knobe, T. Lombrozo, & S. Nichols (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy (7-27). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198718765.003.0002

When Huckleberry Finn fails to turn in Jim, he believes he is going to hell for doing what he has been raised to believe is wrong. When Susan Wolf’s JoJo—raised by his dictator father to embrace his father’s evil values—grows up, he tortures peasants... Read More about Huck vs. Jojo: Moral Ignorance and the (A)symmetry of Praise and Blame.

A Hard Look at Moral Perception (2014)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (2014). A Hard Look at Moral Perception. Philosophical Studies, 172(8), 2055-2072. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0397-6

This paper concerns what I take to be the primary epistemological motivation for defending moral perception. Offering a plausible account of how we gain moral knowledge is one of the central challenges of metaethics. It seems moral perception might h... Read More about A Hard Look at Moral Perception.

To Inspect and Make Safe: On the Morally Responsible Liability of Property Owners (2013)
Journal Article
Faraci, D., & Jaworski, P. M. (2013). To Inspect and Make Safe: On the Morally Responsible Liability of Property Owners. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 17(4), 697-709. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9473-9

There is currently a stalemate over the correct approach to legal liability. To take a prominent example, it remains a point of contention whether land owners should be held liable for injuries to trespassers. Many of those who insist that land owner... Read More about To Inspect and Make Safe: On the Morally Responsible Liability of Property Owners.

Do Property Rights Presuppose Scarcity? (2013)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (2013). Do Property Rights Presuppose Scarcity?. Journal of Business Ethics, 125(3), 531-537. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1866-0

There is a common view, dating back at least to Hume, that property rights presuppose scarcity. This paper is a critical examination of that thesis. In addition to questioning the thesis, the paper highlights the need to divorce the debate over this... Read More about Do Property Rights Presuppose Scarcity?.

Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox (2012)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (2012). Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox. Philosophia, 41(3), 751-755. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9397-y

In “The possibility of morality,” Phil Brown considers whether moral error theory is best understood as a necessary or contingent thesis. Among other things, Brown contends that the argument from relativity, offered by John Mackie—error theory’s prog... Read More about Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox.

Review of David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism (2012)
Journal Article
Faraci, D. (2012). Review of David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Journal of Value Inquiry, 46(2), 259-267. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9329-x

Turn over a copy of David Enoch’s Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism, and you will find the usual array of quotations extolling the book’s virtues. The first is from Russ Shafer-Landau—arguably the philosopher most responsible for... Read More about Review of David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.

First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality (2010)
Journal Article
Coons, C., & Faraci, D. (2010). First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality. Philosophia, 38(4), 733-740. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9250-0

In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving... Read More about First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality.