Dr David Faraci david.n.faraci@durham.ac.uk
Associate Professor
Review of David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism
Faraci, David
Authors
Abstract
Turn over a copy of David Enoch’s Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism, and you will find the usual array of quotations extolling the book’s virtues. The first is from Russ Shafer-Landau—arguably the philosopher most responsible for the current resurgence of Moorean-style non-naturalism—who writes that this “is the best book that has ever been written in defense of ethical realism.” The last is from Hartry Field, who claims that “on the scale of texts arguing for an obviously false conclusion, this actually ranks pretty high!”
Citation
Faraci, D. (2012). Review of David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Journal of Value Inquiry, 46(2), 259-267. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9329-x
Journal Article Type | Book Review |
---|---|
Online Publication Date | May 1, 2012 |
Publication Date | May 1, 2012 |
Deposit Date | Sep 3, 2018 |
Publicly Available Date | Sep 4, 2018 |
Journal | Journal of Value Inquiry |
Print ISSN | 0022-5363 |
Electronic ISSN | 1573-0492 |
Publisher | Springer |
Peer Reviewed | Not Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 46 |
Issue | 2 |
Pages | 259-267 |
Item Discussed | Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism by Enoch, David; |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9329-x |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1611750 |
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Copyright Statement
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in the Journal of value inquiry. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9329-x
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