A defence of jury nullification

Brooks, Thom

Abstract

In both Great Britain and the United States there has been a growing debate about the modern acceptability of jury nullification. Properly understoodj,u ries do not havea ny constitutionalr ight to ignore the law, but they do have the power to do so nevertheless. Juries that nullify may be motivated by a variety of concerns:t oo harshs entencesi,m properg overnmenta ction. racism, etc. In this article, I shall attempt to defend jury nullification on a number of grounds. First, I discusst he use of generalv erdicts and reject their replacemenitn criminal trials by special verdicts. Second, I examine verdicts based upon mistakes and racial prejudice, turning my attention to perverse verdicts and the question of whether or not juries are guilty of legislating when nullifying the law. Finally, I look at the problem of the awarding of excessive damages by juries. My goal will be to provide a sound theoretical defence of the practice of jury nullification.

Citation

Brooks, T. (2009). A defence of jury nullification. In T. Brooks (Ed.), The Right to a Fair Trial (225-247). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315085401-7

• Online Publication Date: Jul 5, 2017
• Publication Date: 2009
• Deposit Date: Feb 22, 2025
• Publisher: Routledge
• Pages: 225-247
• Book Title: The Right to a Fair Trial
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315085401-7
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/3535061