A Problem for Natural-Kind Essentialism and Formal Causes

Alvarado, José Tomás; Tugby, Matthew

Abstract

A combination of formal causation and natural-kind essentialism has good prospects. After all, natural-kind essentialists are under pressure to accept that natural kinds ground or formally cause the properties that characterize them. However, natural-kind essentialists are committed to the claim that natural kinds essentially depend on the properties that characterize them, such as the property of unit negative charge in the case of the electron kind. We argue that, given plausible assumptions about grounding and dependence, these claims clash. After presenting the problem, we consider and criticize ways in which natural-kind essentialists could try to avoid it.

Citation

Alvarado, J. T., & Tugby, M. (2021). A Problem for Natural-Kind Essentialism and Formal Causes. In L. Jansen, & P. Sandstad (Eds.), Neo-Aristotelian perspectives on formal causation (201-221). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429329821

• Online Publication Date: Mar 22, 2021
• Publication Date: 2021
• Deposit Date: Jan 6, 2021
• Publicly Available Date: Sep 8, 2022
• Publisher: Routledge
• Pages: 201-221
• Series Title: Routledge Studies in Metaphysics
• Book Title: Neo-Aristotelian perspectives on formal causation
• Chapter Number: 10
• ISBN: 9780367341206
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429329821
• Keywords: Natural Kinds, Essentialism, Formal Causation, Grounding, Essential Dependence
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1626298
• Contract Date: Dec 15, 2020