Professor Matthew Tugby matthew.tugby@durham.ac.uk
Professor
Dispositional realism, as we shall use the term, is a non-reductive, anti-Humean approach to dispositions which says that natural properties confer certain dispositions as a matter of metaphysical necessity. A strong form of dispositional realism is known as pan-dispositionalism, which is typically interpreted as the view that all natural properties are identical with, or essentially dependent on, dispositions. One of the most serious problems facing pan-dispositionalism is the conceivability objection, and the solution commonly offered by essentialists employs the so-called redescription strategy. In this paper I argue that this orthodox strategy fails in certain cases. This argument, in turn, shows that essentialist forms of dispositional realism are implausible. The discussion points us towards an improved version of dispositional realism. According to this new version, natural properties are not essentially dispositional but necessarily ground dispositions.
Tugby, M. (2022). Dispositional realism without dispositional essences. Synthese, 200(3), Article 222. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03554-9
Journal Article Type | Article |
---|---|
Acceptance Date | Dec 14, 2021 |
Online Publication Date | May 13, 2022 |
Publication Date | 2022-06 |
Deposit Date | May 17, 2022 |
Publicly Available Date | May 17, 2022 |
Journal | Synthese |
Print ISSN | 0039-7857 |
Electronic ISSN | 1573-0964 |
Publisher | Springer |
Peer Reviewed | Peer Reviewed |
Volume | 200 |
Issue | 3 |
Article Number | 222 |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03554-9 |
Public URL | https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1205887 |
Published Journal Article
(919 Kb)
PDF
Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Copyright Statement
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Metaphysics and Science
(2013)
Book
The Laws of Modality
(2022)
Journal Article
Abduction and the Scientific Realist Case for Properties
(2020)
Journal Article
Potentiality: actualism minus naturalism equals platonism
(2020)
Journal Article
About Durham Research Online (DRO)
Administrator e-mail: dro.admin@durham.ac.uk
This application uses the following open-source libraries:
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
Apache License Version 2.0 (http://www.apache.org/licenses/)
SIL OFL 1.1 (http://scripts.sil.org/OFL)
MIT License (http://opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.html)
CC BY 3.0 ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
Powered by Worktribe © 2024
Advanced Search