Human Virtues and Natural Values

James, Simon P.

Abstract

In several works, Holmes Rolston III has argued that a satisfactory environmental ethic cannot be built on a virtue ethical foundation. His first argument amounts to the charge that because virtue ethics is by nature 'self-centred' or egoistic it is also inherently 'human-centred' and hence ill suited to treating environmental matters. According to his second argument, virtue ethics is perniciously human-centred since it 'locates' the value of a thing, not in the thing itself, but in the agent who is 'ennobled' by valuing it. I argue that these charges, though illuminating, are not in the final analysis compelling. The first, I suggest, misconceives the role of motivation in virtue ethics, while the second ultimately rests on a misunderstanding of the place of the human perspective in ethical considerations.

Citation

James, S. P. (2006). Human Virtues and Natural Values. Environmental Ethics, 28(4), 339-354

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: 2006-11
• Deposit Date: Mar 26, 2008
• Journal: Environmental Ethics
• Print ISSN: 0163-4275
• Electronic ISSN: 2153-7895
• Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 28
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 339-354
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1576782
• Publisher URL: http://www.cep.unt.edu/vol/vol28.html