Against Relational Value

James, Simon P.

Abstract

In some environmental circles, talk of relational values is very much in fashion. It is said that we must think in terms of such values if we are to understand how such things as canyons, mangroves, and coral reefs matter to people. But that is bad advice. Appeals to relational values are typically misleading in several respects. Granted, those who make such appeals often do so in order to make the important point that some values are neither intrinsic nor instrumental in form; but that point can be made more clearly by referring to other concepts, such as that of constitutive value. To this objection, some may respond that appeals to relational value are nonetheless useful. However, as things stand, their usefulness remains unproven.

Citation

James, S. P. (2022). Against Relational Value. The Harvard Review of Philosophy, 29, 45-54. https://doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview20228645

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Aug 9, 2022
• Publication Date: 2022
• Deposit Date: Oct 3, 2022
• Publicly Available Date: Oct 5, 2022
• Journal: The Harvard Review of Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 1062-6239
• Electronic ISSN: 2153-9154
• Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
• Peer Reviewed: Not Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 29
• Pages: 45-54
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview20228645
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1190440