Are There No Things That Are Scientific Theories?

French, S.; Vickers, P.

Abstract

The ontological status of theories themselves has recently re-emerged as a live topic in the philosophy of science. We consider whether a recent approach within the philosophy of art can shed some light on this issue. For many years philosophers of aesthetics have debated a paradox in the (meta)ontology of musical works (e.g. Levinson [1980]). Taken individually, there are good reasons to accept each of the following three propositions: (i) musical works are created; (ii) musical works are abstract objects; (iii) abstract objects cannot be created. However it seems clear that, if one wants to avoid inconsistency, one cannot commit to all three. Following up recent developments courtesy of Cameron ([2008a]), we consider how one might respond to the corresponding set of propositions in the (meta)ontology of scientific theories.

Citation

French, S., & Vickers, P. (2011). Are There No Things That Are Scientific Theories?. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62(4), 771-804. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr011

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Jan 1, 2011
• Deposit Date: Aug 25, 2011
• Publicly Available Date: Feb 12, 2013
• Journal: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
• Print ISSN: 0007-0882
• Electronic ISSN: 1464-3537
• Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 62
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 771-804
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr011
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1528342