The Pareto Dominant Strategy-proof and Fair rule for Problems with Indivisible Goods.

Kesten, O.; Yazici, A.

Abstract

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. We consider two interesting cases of this problem: (1) the supply of each object is exactly one; and (2) the supply of an object may be greater than one. Our central requirements are strategy-proofness and ex post fairness. We propose a particular rule satisfying strategy-proofness and no-envy (as well as equal treatment of equals). For the first case, it Pareto dominates any other rule satisfying strategy-proofness and equal treatment of equals. For the second case, it Pareto dominates any other rule satisfying strategy-proofness and no-envy.

Citation

Kesten, O., & Yazici, A. (2012). The Pareto Dominant Strategy-proof and Fair rule for Problems with Indivisible Goods. Economic Theory, 50(2), 463-488. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0569-3

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: 2012-06
• Deposit Date: Oct 18, 2012
• Journal: Economic Theory
• Print ISSN: 0938-2259
• Electronic ISSN: 1432-0479
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 50
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 463-488
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0569-3
• Keywords: Indivisible goods, Strategy-proofness, Fairness, No-envy.
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1472680