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A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem'

Klijn, F.; Yazici, A.

A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem' Thumbnail


Authors

F. Klijn



Abstract

We show that the full version of the so-called ‘rural hospital theorem’ generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents’ preferences satisfy substitutability, the domain of weakly separable preferences is also maximal for the rural hospital theorem to hold.

Citation

Klijn, F., & Yazici, A. (2014). A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem'. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 54, 63-73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.09.003

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Sep 1, 2014
Online Publication Date Sep 10, 2014
Publication Date Oct 1, 2014
Deposit Date Sep 4, 2014
Publicly Available Date Sep 11, 2014
Journal Journal of Mathematical Economics
Print ISSN 0304-4068
Electronic ISSN 1873-1538
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 54
Pages 63-73
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.09.003
Keywords Matching, Many-to-many, Stability, Rural hospital theorem.
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1445927

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Copyright Statement
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Mathematical Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 54, 2014, 10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.09.003.





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