Categoricalism, Dispositionalism, and the Epistemology of Properties

Tugby, Matthew

Abstract

Notoriously, the dispositional view of natural properties is thought to face a number of regress problems, one of which points to an epistemological worry. In this paper, I argue that the rival categorical view is also susceptible to the same kind of regress problem. This problem can be overcome, most plausibly, with the development of a structuralist epistemology. After identifying problems faced by alternative solutions, I sketch the main features of this structuralist epistemological approach, referring to graph-theoretic modelling in the process. Given that both the categoricalists and dispositionalists are under pressure to adopt this same epistemological approach in light of the regress problem, this suggests that the categoricalist versus dispositionalist debate is best fought on metaphysical rather than epistemological grounds.

Citation

Tugby, M. (2014). Categoricalism, Dispositionalism, and the Epistemology of Properties. Synthese, 191(6), 1147-1162. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0316-y

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jul 12, 2013
• Online Publication Date: Jul 26, 2013
• Publication Date: Apr 1, 2014
• Deposit Date: Oct 7, 2013
• Publicly Available Date: Sep 1, 2015
• Journal: Synthese
• Print ISSN: 0039-7857
• Electronic ISSN: 1573-0964
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 191
• Issue: 6
• Pages: 1147-1162
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0316-y
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1468533