Korsgaard v. Gewirth on Universalization: Why Gewirthians are Kantians and Kantians Ought to be Gewirthians

Beyleveld, D.

Abstract

Christine Korsgaard claims that Gewirth’s argument for morality fails to demonstrate that there is a categorically binding principle on action because it operates with the assumption that reasons for action are essentially private. This attribution is unfounded and Korsgaard’s own argument for moral obligation, in its appeal to Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument to establish that reasons for action are essentially public, is misdirected and unnecessary. Gewirth’s attempt to demonstrate a strictly a priori connection between a moral principle and the concept of being an agent as such is essentially Kantian, and recognizing that the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives is categorically binding requires Kantians to accept that Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency is the supreme practical principle.

Citation

Beyleveld, D. (2015). Korsgaard v. Gewirth on Universalization: Why Gewirthians are Kantians and Kantians Ought to be Gewirthians. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 12(5), 573-597. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681026

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Online Publication Date: Sep 10, 2015
• Publication Date: 2015-09
• Deposit Date: Feb 22, 2013
• Publicly Available Date: Jul 2, 2013
• Journal: Journal of Moral Philosophy
• Print ISSN: 1740-4681
• Electronic ISSN: 1745-5243
• Publisher: Brill Academic Publishers
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 12
• Issue: 5
• Pages: 573-597
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681026
• Keywords: Kant, Public reasons, Gewirth, Categorical impartiality, Korsgaard.