Nomic Necessity for Platonists

Tugby, M.

Abstract

After identifying some existing explanations offered by nomic necessitarians for the alleged necessary connections between natural properties and their dispositional or nomic features, I discuss a less explored necessitarian strategy. This strategy is available to Platonists who hold that properties exist necessarily, as most do.

Citation

Tugby, M. (2013). Nomic Necessity for Platonists. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2(4), 324-331. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.99

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Dec 1, 2013
• Deposit Date: Apr 8, 2014
• Publicly Available Date: Sep 1, 2015
• Journal: Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
• Electronic ISSN: 2161-2234
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 2
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 324-331
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.99
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1466924