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Match-Fixing under Competitive Odds.

Saha, B.; Kanti Bag, P.

Authors

P. Kanti Bag



Abstract

Two bookmakers compete in Bertrand fashion while setting odds on the outcomes of a sporting contest where an influential punter (or betting syndicate) may bribe some player(s) to fix the contest. Zero profit and bribe prevention may not always hold together. When the influential punter is quite powerful, the bookies may coordinate on prices and earn positive profits for fear of letting the ‘lemons’ (i.e., the influential punter) in. On the other hand, sometimes the bookies make zero profits but also admit match-fixing. When match-fixing occurs, it often involves bribery of only the strong team. The theoretical analysis is intended to address the problem of growing incidence of betting related corruption in world sports including cricket, horse races, tennis, soccer, basketball, wrestling, snooker, etc.

Citation

Saha, B., & Kanti Bag, P. (2011). Match-Fixing under Competitive Odds. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 318-344. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.001

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date 2011-11
Deposit Date Aug 7, 2014
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Print ISSN 0899-8256
Electronic ISSN 1090-2473
Publisher Elsevier
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 73
Issue 2
Pages 318-344
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.001
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1447019