Platonic Dispositionalism

Tugby, Matthew

Abstract

In this paper I argue that if one subscribes to dispositionalism — the view that natural properties are irreducibly dispositional in character — then one ought to favour a Platonic view of properties. That is, dispositionalists ought to view properties as transcendent universals. I argue for this on the grounds that only with transcendent universals in play can two central dispositionalist platitudes be accounted for in a satisfactory way. Given that dispositionalism is becoming an increasingly influential view in the metaphysics of science, my argument, if successful, suggests that Platonism will see something of a revival in contemporary metaphysics. This new kind of Platonism is shown to have some striking metaphysical and epistemological consequences.

Citation

Tugby, M. (2013). Platonic Dispositionalism. Mind, 122(486), 451-480. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt071

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Publication Date: Apr 1, 2013
• Deposit Date: Sep 30, 2013
• Publicly Available Date: Sep 1, 2015
• Journal: Mind
• Print ISSN: 0026-4423
• Electronic ISSN: 1460-2113
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 122
• Issue: 486
• Pages: 451-480
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzt071
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1446571