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Platonic Dispositionalism

Tugby, Matthew

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In this paper I argue that if one subscribes to dispositionalism — the view that natural properties are irreducibly dispositional in character — then one ought to favour a Platonic view of properties. That is, dispositionalists ought to view properties as transcendent universals. I argue for this on the grounds that only with transcendent universals in play can two central dispositionalist platitudes be accounted for in a satisfactory way. Given that dispositionalism is becoming an increasingly influential view in the metaphysics of science, my argument, if successful, suggests that Platonism will see something of a revival in contemporary metaphysics. This new kind of Platonism is shown to have some striking metaphysical and epistemological consequences.


Tugby, M. (2013). Platonic Dispositionalism. Mind, 122(486), 451-480.

Journal Article Type Article
Publication Date Apr 1, 2013
Deposit Date Sep 30, 2013
Publicly Available Date Sep 1, 2015
Journal Mind
Print ISSN 0026-4423
Electronic ISSN 1460-2113
Publisher Oxford University Press
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 122
Issue 486
Pages 451-480


Accepted Journal Article (135 Kb)

Copyright Statement
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Mind following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Tugby, Matthew (2013) 'Platonic dispositionalism.', Mind., 122 (486). pp. 451-480 is available online at:

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