Should Lotteries Offer Discounts on Multiple Tickets?

Damianov, D.S.

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.002

Should Lotteries Offer Discounts on Multiple Tickets?

Damianov, D.S.

Authors

Professor Damian Damianov damian.damianov@durham.ac.uk
Professor

Abstract

In a complete information setting we show that the standard lottery–in which each lottery ticket is offered for the same price–is an optimal fundraising mechanism in the presence of strong asymmetries in the way bettors value the prize and the public good provided with the lottery proceeds. When participants are more homogeneous, it is optimal to offer discounts for the purchase of multiple tickets.

Citation

Damianov, D. (2015). Should Lotteries Offer Discounts on Multiple Tickets?. Economics Letters, 126, 84-86. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.002

Journal Article Type	Article
Acceptance Date	Nov 7, 2014
Online Publication Date	Nov 22, 2014
Publication Date	Jan 1, 2015
Deposit Date	Feb 10, 2015
Publicly Available Date	Feb 16, 2015
Journal	Economics Letters
Print ISSN	0165-1765
Electronic ISSN	1873-7374
Publisher	Elsevier
Peer Reviewed	Peer Reviewed
Volume	126
Pages	84-86
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.002
Keywords	Fundraising mechanisms, Complete information, Asymmetries, Lottery ticket discounts.
Public URL	https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1436855

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Copyright Statement
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 126, January 2015, 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.11.002.