The virtues of unknowing

Smith, R.D.

Abstract

Traditional epistemology is often said to have reached an impasse, and recent interest in virtue epistemology supposedly marks a turn away from philosophers’ traditional focus on problems of knowledge and truth. Yet that focus re-emerges, especially among ‘reliabilist’ virtue epistemologists. I argue for a more ‘responsibilist’ approach and for the importance of some of the quieter and gentler epistemic virtues, by contrast with the tough-minded ones that are currently popular in education. In particular I make a case for what I here call ‘unknowing’: a positive state that is not the same as ignorance. I acknowledge the mystical connotations of the term, and suggest that there is a strong interest in unknowing in writers such as Plato, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. In their style of philosophising they also address the paradox of being knowing about unknowingness itself.

Citation

Smith, R. (2016). The virtues of unknowing. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 50(2), 272-284. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12206

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Aug 7, 2015
• Online Publication Date: Jun 16, 2016
• Publication Date: May 1, 2016
• Deposit Date: Dec 11, 2015
• Publicly Available Date: May 1, 2018
• Journal: Journal of Philosophy of Education
• Print ISSN: 0309-8249
• Electronic ISSN: 1467-9752
• Publisher: Wiley
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 50
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 272-284
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12206
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1416752