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Towards a Kantian Phenomenology of Hope

Beyleveld, Deryck; Ziche, Paul

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Authors

Paul Ziche



Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (CPoJ) can be, or otherwise ought to be, regarded as a transcendental phenomenology of hope. Kant states repeatedly that CPoJ mediates between the first two Critiques, or between the theoretical knowledge we arrive at on the basis of understanding and reason’s foundational role for practical philosophy. In other words, exercising the power of judgment is implicated whenever we try to bring together the ethical issue of strictly determining our actions on the one hand and the necessity to act in the physical world on the other. We will argue that this mediating function is properly understood only if the ideations produced by self-understanding are characterized as objects of rationally required hope or fear.

Citation

Beyleveld, D., & Ziche, P. (2015). Towards a Kantian Phenomenology of Hope. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 18(5), 927-942. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9564-x

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Jan 16, 2015
Online Publication Date Feb 8, 2015
Publication Date Nov 1, 2015
Deposit Date Feb 19, 2015
Publicly Available Date Feb 24, 2015
Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Print ISSN 1386-2820
Electronic ISSN 1572-8447
Publisher Springer
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 18
Issue 5
Pages 927-942
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9564-x
Keywords Kant, Hope, Judgment, Faith, Philosophy of Religion, Epistemology.
Public URL https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1414559

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Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Copyright Statement
Advance online version © The Author(s) 2015. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com.






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