The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (CPoJ) can be, or otherwise ought to be, regarded as a transcendental phenomenology of hope. Kant states repeatedly that CPoJ mediates between the first two Critiques, or between the theoretical knowledge we arrive at on the basis of understanding and reason’s foundational role for practical philosophy. In other words, exercising the power of judgment is implicated whenever we try to bring together the ethical issue of strictly determining our actions on the one hand and the necessity to act in the physical world on the other. We will argue that this mediating function is properly understood only if the ideations produced by self-understanding are characterized as objects of rationally required hope or fear.
Beyleveld, D., & Ziche, P. (2015). Towards a Kantian Phenomenology of Hope. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 18(5), 927-942. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9564-x