In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity.

Cowie, Christopher

Abstract

According to epistemic instrumentalists the normativity of evidence for belief is best explained in terms of the practical utility of forming evidentially supported beliefs. Traditional arguments for instrumentalism—arguments based on naturalism and motivation—lack suasive force against opponents. A new argument for the view—the Argument from Coincidence—is presented. The argument shows that only instrumentalists can avoid positing an embarrassing coincidence between the practical value of believing in accordance with one’s evidence, and the existence of reasons so to believe. Responses are considered and shown to be inadequate.

Citation

Cowie, C. (2014). In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. Synthese, 191(16), 4003-4017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0510-6

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jun 14, 2014
• Online Publication Date: Jun 28, 2014
• Publication Date: 2014-11
• Deposit Date: Sep 6, 2017
• Journal: Synthese
• Print ISSN: 0039-7857
• Electronic ISSN: 1573-0964
• Publisher: Springer
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 191
• Issue: 16
• Pages: 4003-4017
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0510-6