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Linguistic Evidence Against Predicativism

Hinzen, Wolfram

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Authors

Wolfram Hinzen



Abstract

The view that proper names are uniformly predicates (‘predicativism’) has recently gained prominence. I review linguistic evidence against it. Overall, the (cross-) linguistic evidence suggests that proper names function as predicates when they appear in a grammatically predicative position and as referential expressions when they are grammatically in a referential position. Conceptual grounds on which the predicativist view might nonetheless be upheld include ‘uniformity’, i.e., that a single semantic value be lexically specified for names in all of their occurrences irrespective of differences in their grammar. However, ‘being a predicate’ or ‘being referential’ are not lexical properties of words but indications for how these grammatically function on an occasion of their use. Moreover, the intuitively referential and intuitively predicative uses of proper names precisely covary with grammatical differences. A proper name is therefore a predicate when it is predicatively used, not when its grammar and meaning are different. Given this grammar-meaning alignment there is no motivation to posit a novel ‘covert syntax’ for names in their referential uses, which breaks this alignment. Cross-linguistic evidence from languages such as Catalan, which features overt determiners in referential uses of proper names, moreover turns out to strongly support the view that the grammar of human language is systematically sensitive to differences in the referential and predicative uses of names

Citation

Hinzen, W. (2016). Linguistic Evidence Against Predicativism. Philosophy Compass, 11(10), 591-608. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12348

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Sep 13, 2016
Online Publication Date Oct 7, 2016
Publication Date Oct 7, 2016
Deposit Date Sep 13, 2016
Publicly Available Date Oct 12, 2016
Journal Philosophy Compass
Publisher Wiley
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 11
Issue 10
Pages 591-608
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12348

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Publisher Licence URL
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Copyright Statement
© 2016 The Authors. Philosophy Compass Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.




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