Antitakeover Provisions and CEO Monetary Benefits: Revisiting the E-Index

Al Dah, B.; Michael, A.; Dixon, R.

Abstract

We analyze and group antitakeover provisions as they relate to CEO’s monetary benefits. We specifically focus on the determinants of the six E-index provisions that were proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2009) to conversely affect firm value. The six provisions are split into two indices: those that provide managers with a monetary benefit if a takeover was successful (MB provisions) and those that do not (TP provisions). Results indicate that CEOs with a role duality use their power to influence the adoption of MB provisions and resist the adoption of TP provisions. Moreover, in the presence of CEO duality, the relationship between MB provisions and firm value worsens. On the other hand, the relationship between TP provisions and firm value is unaffected by the presence of CEO duality. This suggests that CEOs having a role duality do not feel the need to work in the shareholders’ best interest when entrenched with MB provisions. Our findings suggest that studying all the provisions of the E-index as a whole can be misleading in some cases.

Citation

Al Dah, B., Michael, A., & Dixon, R. (2017). Antitakeover Provisions and CEO Monetary Benefits: Revisiting the E-Index. Research in International Business and Finance, 42, 992-1004. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.033

• Journal Article Type: Article
• Acceptance Date: Jul 3, 2017
• Online Publication Date: Jul 14, 2017
• Publication Date: Dec 31, 2017
• Deposit Date: Jul 21, 2017
• Publicly Available Date: Jan 14, 2019
• Journal: Research in International Business and Finance
• Print ISSN: 0275-5319
• Electronic ISSN: 1878-3384
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Peer Reviewed: Peer Reviewed
• Volume: 42
• Pages: 992-1004
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.033
• Public URL: https://durham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1373365