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Modal Platonism and the Problem of Negativity

Tugby, Matthew

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The Platonic account of modality says, roughly, that truths about alien possibilities are grounded in uninstantiated universals. Recently, Ingram has raised a problem for this kind of view, which is that it apparently requires negative facts to play a truthmaking role. Ingram offers an alternative Platonic account which makes use of modal instantiation relations. In this paper, I highlight some of the costs of Ingram’s new account and argue that a more appealing version of Platonism—and modal theory in general—is one that is supplemented with an ontology of totality facts.


Tugby, M. (2018). Modal Platonism and the Problem of Negativity. Erkenntnis, 83(3), 465-476.

Journal Article Type Article
Acceptance Date Apr 3, 2017
Online Publication Date Apr 22, 2017
Publication Date Jun 1, 2018
Deposit Date May 11, 2017
Publicly Available Date May 12, 2017
Journal Erkenntnis
Print ISSN 0165-0106
Electronic ISSN 1572-8420
Publisher Springer
Peer Reviewed Peer Reviewed
Volume 83
Issue 3
Pages 465-476
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Published Journal Article (Advance online version) (389 Kb)

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Copyright Statement
Advance online version © The Author(s) 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

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